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I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating to oil,
gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 1, 2015, through October
31, 2016. The cases examined include decisions of state and federal courts
in the State of Texas and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.1
* Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included. Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of
interest. The facts in the cases are sometimes simplified to focus on the legal principles.
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II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES2
A. HYSAW V. DAWKINS
In Hysaw v. Dawkins,3 the Texas Supreme Court considered the
double-fraction issue in the context of a will-construction dispute and
held that the will devised a fraction of royalty, not a fractional royalty.4
The supreme court used this case to give some guidance on how these
double-fraction conveyances are to be construed. The parties aligned as
descendants of three sibling-beneficiaries—Inez, Dorothy, and Howard—
under the 1947 will of their mother, Ethel.5 Ethel’s will divided her land
into three unequal tracts, and she devised to each child fee simple title in
one of the tracts, subject to the conveyance of a non-participating royalty
to each child in all of the tracts.6 The will provided (with mirror-image
provisions for each child) as follows:
I will and bequeath to each of the above named children fee simple
title to the lands designated to go to them, subject, however, to the
following . . . [1] each of my children shall have and hold an undi-
vided one-third (1/3) of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all oil, gas or
other minerals in or under or that may be produced from any of said
lands, the same being a non-participating royalty interest; that is to
say . . . [the named child] shall not participate [as to the land devised
2. Other cases dealing with title and conveyancing issues include the following:
Wenske v. Ealy, No. 13-15-00012-CV, 2016 WL 363735, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
Jan. 28, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (deed construction); Mueller v. Davis, 485 S.W.3d
622 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016), rev’d, No. 16–0155, 2017 WL 2299316 (Tex. Mar. 23,
2017) (deed Mother Hubbard clause); Consol. Prop. Interests, LLC v. Payne, No. 12-15-
00105-CV, 2016 WL 786939, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(three-part mineral deed); Spartan Tex. Six Capital Partners, Ltd. v. Perryman, 494 S.W.3d
735 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. filed) (Duhig Rule); Burlington Res. Oil
& Gas Co. v. Petromax Operating Co., 486 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no
pet.) (construction of assignment); Dragon v. Harrell, No. 04-14-00711-CV, 2016 WL
1238165, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 30, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (deed
conveying fraction of royalty or fractional royalty); Alford v. McKeithen, No. 12-14-00262-
CV, 2016 WL 1253902, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 31, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (deed
incorporating less than all of Exhibit A into the deed); Bounds v. Prud’Homme, No. 12-15-
00177-CV, 2016 WL 1254072, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 31, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.)
(deed construction of reservation); Kardell v. Acker, 492 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2016, no pet.) (conveyance of royalty); Bauer v. White, No. 13-16-00054-CV, 2016
WL 3136608, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 2, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(community property presumption); Richardson v. Mills, No. 12-15-00170-CV, 2016 WL
7488860, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 30, 2016), superseded on rehearing, No. 12-15-00170-
CV, 2017 WL 511893 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 8, 2017, pet. denied) (deed or lease
construction); Combest & Mountain Laurel Minerals v. Mustang Minerals, LLC, 502
S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. filed) (reservation in land described or
interest conveyed); Laborde Props., L.P. v. U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC, No. 04-16-00168-
CV, 2016 WL 5922404, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 12, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.)
(fixed or floating royalty clause); Jackson v. Wildflower Prod. Co., Inc., 505 S.W. 3d 80
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. denied) (mineral deed without warranty is a quitclaim
deed); Greer v. Shook, 503 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. filed) (conflicting
fractions, legacy of the one-eighth royalty, and estate misconception).
3. 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
4. Id. at 16.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id.
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to the other two children], but that [2] the said [named child] shall
receive one-third of one-eighth royalty, provided there is no royalty
sold or conveyed by me covering the lands so willed to [the child], and
[3] should there be any royalty sold during my lifetime then [the three
children] shall each receive one-third of the remainder of the unsold
royalty.7
The supreme court broke the clause into the three separate numbered
clauses for analysis. Inez’s descendants executed a lease that provided for
a royalty of one-fifth.8 Inez’s descendants contended the will devised to
Dorothy and Howard a fractional royalty on Inez’s land (one-third of
one-eighth equals one twenty-fourth to each). Dorothy’s and Howard’s
descendants contended the will devised to Dorothy and Howard a one-
third fraction of royalty on Inez’s land (one-third of one-fifth equals one-
fifteenth to each).9
The supreme court reviewed construction principles applicable to wills
and observed that “[s]imilar construction principles apply to non-testa-
mentary instruments [i.e., deeds] conveying mineral interests.”10 The su-
preme court used will and deed precedents without distinction,11
concluding that the will showed Ethel’s intent for each of her children to
share equally in all royalties under all circumstances. It relied on the first
provision’s sharing of royalty by each child in the royalties from all the
lands; the equal sharing required under the third provision’s fraction of
royalty devise; and the fact that Ethel used the term “‘one-eighth royalty’
as shorthand for the entire royalty interest a lessor could retain under a
mineral lease.”12 The supreme court thus held that “Ethel’s will devised
to each child 1/3 of any and all royalty interest on all the devised land
tracts.”13
From the beginning of the oil and gas industry in Texas until the mid-
1970s, a lessor’s royalty under an oil and gas lease was almost always one-
eighth.14 The royalty rate of one-eighth was “so pervasive that, for de-
cades, courts took judicial notice of it as the standard and customary roy-
alty.”15 Thousands of mineral deeds drafted during those years may have
been drafted under the assumption that the royalty would always be one-
eighth (i.e., that it would never be, for example, one-fifth—referred to as
“historical standardization”) or that the lessor’s interest in lands after the
execution of a lease was only a one-eighth interest (rather than all, sub-
ject to a fee simple determinable in the lessee—referred to as “estate
7. Id. at 14.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 8 (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461–62 (Tex. 1991); Sun Oil Co. v.
Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 15–16.
13. Id. at 16.
14. Id. at 6, 9.
15. Id. at 9–10.
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misconception”).16 “[C]onveyances containing double fractions or two or
more differing fractions present recurring interpretative challenges.”17
The simplest example would be a conveyance of “one-half of the usual 1/
8th royalty,”18 followed by a subsequent oil and gas lease providing for a
three-sixteenths royalty. In this example, did the grantee receive a fixed
royalty of one-half of one-eighth, which equals one-sixteenth of produc-
tion, or a floating royalty of one-half of three-sixteenths, which equals
three thirty-seconds of production? “[C]ourt opinions construing double-
fraction language have yielded mixed results, with no discernible unifying
principle except to the extent the outcome derives from the conveying
instrument’s specific language.”19
Today, we reaffirm our commitment to a holistic approach aimed at
ascertaining intent from all words and all parts of the conveying in-
strument. To discern intent, words and phrases must be construed
together and in context, not in isolation.20 . . .
We further eschew reliance on mechanical or bright-line rules as a
substitute for an intent-focused inquiry rooted in the instrument’s
words. To that end, the estate-misconception theory and the histori-
cal use of 1/8 as the standard royalty may inform the meaning of
fractions stated in multiples of 1/8, but these considerations are not
alone dispositive.21
There are no bright-line rules, but we are looking for rules to better
forecast the construction to be given to a problematic conveyance. This
case, and other precedents, suggest that fractional royalties (particularly
large ones) will be rare, courts will lean toward finding fraction “of” roy-
alty to be the parties’ intent, “two grants” will be rare, and historical
standardization along with estate misconception will be liberally applied
to harmonize conflicting provisions. Thus, much to the chagrin of title
examiners, the significance of this case is that, like pornography, you will
know the meaning of a double-fraction conveyance when you see it.
B. GOSS V. ADDAX MINERALS FUND, LP
In Goss v. Addax Minerals Fund, LP,22 the Amarillo Court of Appeals
held that the discovery rule does not apply to defer the accrual of a cause
of action to correct a plainly evident omission on the face of an unambig-
uous deed.23 The parties aligned as successors-in-interest to Grantor and
Grantee under a 1994 deed. The contract for sale expressly provided that
16. Id. at 10–11.
17. Id. at 9 (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. 1957); Concord Oil
Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. 1998)).
18. Id. at 11 n.13.
19. Id. at 11.
20. Id. at 13 (citing Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1995)).
21. Id.
22. No. 07-14-00167-CV, 2016 WL 1612918, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 21, 2016,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
23. Id. at *5.
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Grantee was to receive all of the minerals. The 1994 deed, prepared by
the title company, reserved and excepted the minerals, and Grantee saw
the deed in 1994. In 2005, Grantee talked to the title company about the
minerals, and on November 30, 2005, the title company “fixed” the prob-
lem by filing an affidavit reciting that the reservation of the minerals to
Grantor was a scrivener’s error.24 Grantee believed and relied upon the
title company’s assurance that the affidavit confirmed Grantee’s title and
ownership in the minerals.25 In March 2012, Grantor leased the minerals.
In April 2013, Grantee sued, alleging “the . . . 1994 deed unambiguously
conveyed the minerals to [Grantee]” (alternatively the deed was ambigu-
ous).26 Grantee also sued for reformation and to quiet title, asserting that
the cause of action accrued in March 2012 and that the discovery rule
applied. The minerals were awarded to Grantor on motion for summary
judgment.27
The format of the deed generally followed the State Bar of Texas real
estate form deed.28 The granting clause conveyed “the property, . . . ex-
cept as to the reservations from and exceptions to warranty.”29 The deed
then provided:
RESERVATIONS FROM AND EXCEPTIONS TO CONVEY-
ANCE AND WARRANTY: Reservations, restrictions and ease-
ments of record, and current year ad valorem taxes. LESS, SAVE
AND EXCEPT HERE FROM ALL OIL, GAS AND OTHER
MINERALS, IN, UNDER AND PRODUCED FROM THE
ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY.30
Because there were no minerals outstanding in any other party, it did
not matter whether the provision as to minerals was construed to be a
reservation or exception. Either way, the minerals did not pass to
Grantee, and therefore Grantor either reserved the minerals or still
owned the minerals.31
The court of appeals also rejected Grantee’s alternative argument that
the deed was ambiguous. Grantee contended that “the ‘subject to’ lan-
guage in the deed’s granting clause [was] intended only to limit the war-
ranty of title.”32 The court held that this alternative reading of the deed
was unreasonable.33 “A deed is ambiguous only if application of estab-
lished rules of construction leaves the instrument susceptible to more
24. Id. at *1.
25. Id. at *5.
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *1 n.1.
29. Id. at *1.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *4.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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than one meaning.34 And the two meanings must each be reasonable.”35
“A claim for reformation of a [voidable] deed is subject to a four-year
limitations period.”36 “A plainly evident omission on an unambiguous
deed’s face is not a type of injury for which the discovery rule is availa-
ble.”37 The court of appeals also held that, even if the discovery rule did
apply, Grantee had actual knowledge of the issue more than four years
before suit was filed and was required to timely file “[r]egardless of
[Grantee’s] subjective belief concerning the effect of the deed.”38 This is a
deed construction case that appears to follow established precedent as to
the application of the discovery rule to plainly evident omissions from
deeds.
C. COYOTE LAKE RANCH, LLC V. CITY OF LUBBOCK
In Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock,39 the Texas Supreme
Court held that “the accommodation doctrine applies to resolve conflicts
between a severed groundwater estate and the surface estate that are not
governed by the express terms of the parties’ agreement.”40 Coyote Lake
Ranch (Ranch) is about ninety miles northwest of the City of Lubbock
(City). In 1953, the owner of the Ranch executed a deed reserving some
water rights but conveying most of its groundwater rights to the City.41
The deed included extensive provisions pertaining to the City’s use and
development of the groundwater, such as the following:
[W]ith the full and exclusive rights of ingress and egress in, over, and
on said lands, so that the Grantee of said water rights may at any
time and location drill water wells and test wells on said lands for the
purpose of investigating, exploring producing, and getting access to
percolating and underground water; together with the rights to [con-
struct certain facilities like pipe lines, power lines, and access roads,
etc.] on, over and under said lands necessary or incidental to any of
said operations, together with . . . the rights to use all that part of said
lands necessary or incidental to the taking of percolating and under-
ground water and the production, treating and transmission of water
therefrom. . . .42
In 2012, the City proposed a plan for a total of eighty test and produc-
tion wells but was unable to reach an agreement with the owner of the
34. Id. at *3 (citing Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. 1980); DeWitt Cty.
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. 1999)).
35. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, 22
S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2000); Colom. Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940
S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996)).
36. Id. at *5 (citing Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2015)).
37. Id. (quoting Cosgrove, 468 S.W.3d at 37).
38. Id.
39. 498 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 2016).
40. Id. at 64.
41. Id. at 55–56.
42. Id. at 56 n.6 (emphasis added).
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Ranch.43 Undeterred, the City began mowing paths to potential drill sites
on the Ranch, citing the broad powers it obtained in the 1953 Deed.44
The Ranch owner contended that the City had breached the terms of the
deed and that the City was obligated to comply with the accommodation
doctrine. The City responded that there was no law holding that the ac-
commodation doctrine applied to severed groundwater estates and that
the City was authorized by its deed to proceed.45 The principal issue was
whether the accommodation doctrine applies to severed groundwater
estates.
The accommodation doctrine broadly provides that “[a]bsent an agree-
ment to the contrary, an oil-and-gas lessee has an implied right to use the
land as reasonably necessary to produce and remove the minerals but
must exercise that right with due regard for the landowner’s rights.”46
Getty Oil Co. specifically held:
[W]here there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the estab-
lished practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasona-
ble usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative
by the lessee.47
Because the accommodation doctrine is only applicable if there is no
agreement between the parties, the supreme court first analyzed the
rights the 1953 Deed gave to the City:
The deed gives the City the right to drill wells “at any time and loca-
tion” but only “for the purpose of” conducting operations to access
the groundwater. The deed then limits the City’s use of the Ranch to
what is “necessary or incidental” to those operations. But the deed
leaves unclear whether the City can do everything necessary or inci-
dental to drilling anywhere, as it claims, or only what is necessary or
incidental to fully access the groundwater, as the Ranch argues.48
Because the deed did not clearly determine the rights of the parties, the
supreme court turned to the question of whether the accommodation
doctrine should apply to a severed groundwater estate.
The supreme court then reviewed and commented upon most of its
accommodation doctrine cases.49 Of particular interest, it cited to and
quoted from the Merriman case with approval as to the elements that
must be proved to obtain relief:
43. Id. at 57.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 55 (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971)).
47. Id. at 61 (alteration in original) (quoting Getty Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d at 622).
48. Id. at 59 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 60–63 (citing Getty Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d at 618; Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483
S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974); Tar-
rant Cty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One v. Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909
(Tex. 1993); Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013)).
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To obtain relief on a claim that the mineral lessee has failed to ac-
commodate an existing use of the surface, the surface owner has the
burden to prove that (1) the lessee’s use completely precludes or
substantially impairs the existing use, and (2) there is no reasonable
alternative method available to the surface owner by which the ex-
isting use can be continued. If the surface owner carries that burden,
he must further prove that given the particular circumstances, there
are alternative reasonable, customary, and industry-accepted meth-
ods available to the lessee which will allow recovery of the minerals
and also allow the surface owner to continue the existing use.50
“The accommodation doctrine, based on the principle that conflicting
estates should act with due regard for each other’s rights, has provided a
sound and workable basis for resolving conflicts between ownership in-
terests.”51 Groundwater and mineral estates, while somewhat different,
are also very similar in that they are subterranean, have the same right to
use the surface, are controlled by the rule of capture, are protected from
waste, and are owned by the landowner in place.52 The supreme court
was “reluctant to search for a new approach to resolving disputes over a
severed estate’s implied right to reasonable use of the surface when a
proven rule [was] at hand.”53 Accordingly, the supreme court held that
“the accommodation doctrine extends to [severed] groundwater es-
tates.”54 The supreme court expressly declined to consider in this opinion
“whether the accommodation doctrine is workable when both the miner-
als and the groundwater have been severed from the land.”55
The supreme court was unanimous in extending the accommodation
doctrine to severed groundwater estates, but three justices in a concurring
opinion partially disagreed with the majority. Those justices would have
held that the deed itself governed some of the contested surface uses in
the case.56 This case is significant in that it extended the accommodation
doctrine to severed groundwater estates.
50. Id. at 62 (quoting Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249 (Tex. 2013)).
51. Id. at 63.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 64.
54. Id. at 65.
55. Id. at 65 n.55.
56. Id. at 65–67 (Boyd, J., concurring).
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III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES57
A. CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, L.L.C. V. HYDER
In Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Hyder,58 the Texas Supreme
Court held that an overriding royalty was free of all post-production
costs.59 The opinion also attempts to clarify the deductibility of post-pro-
duction costs generally under “market value at the well” and “proceeds
lease” royalty clauses. The Hyder family leased 948 mineral acres in the
Barnett Shale under a lease that included an overriding royalty as part of
the royalty payable to lessor.60 The relevant parts of the lease in dispute
provided for “‘a perpetual, cost-free (except only its portion of produc-
tion taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) of gross production
obtained’ from directional wells drilled on the lease but bottomed on
nearby land”;61 an optional right to take royalty in-kind; and a disclaimer
that “Lessors and Lessee agree that the holding in the case of Heritage
Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) shall have no
application to the terms and provisions of this Lease.”62 Heritage Re-
sources construed a market value at the well royalty clause and held that
the royalty payable in that case was effectively subject to its proportion-
ate part of post-production costs because market value at the well meant
at the well.63 The parties in Hyder aligned as “Lessor” and “Lessee.”
They agreed that the overriding royalty payable to Lessor was “free of
production costs; they dispute[d] whether it [was] also free of postproduc-
tion costs.”64
Before focusing on the overriding royalty clause, the supreme court
briefly addressed the gas royalty clause, which was a “proceeds”
provision:
[T]he price-received basis for payment in the lease is sufficient in
itself to excuse the lessors from bearing postproduction costs. . . . But
57. Other cases dealing with lease and leasing issues include the following: Flanagan v.
Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 3:15-CV-0222-B, 2015 WL 6736648, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4,
2015) (mem. op.) (implied duty to reasonably market); Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v.
TRO-X, L.P., 511 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. filed) (top leases); Allegiance
Expl., LLC v. Davis, No. 02-13-00349-CV, 2016 WL 1164331, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Mar. 24, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (production in paying quantities); Escondido Res.
II, LLC v. Justapor Ranch Co., No. 04-14-00905-CV, 2016 WL 2936411, at *1 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio May 18, 2016, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (lease termination for failure to pay
royalties); Conocophillips Co. v. Koopmann, No. 13-14-00402-CV, 2016 WL 2967689, at *1
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 19, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (perpetuation of term
NPRI); Brammer Petroleum, Inc. v. Bagley Minerals, L.P., No. 06-15-00091-CV, 2016 WL
3212496, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 8, 2016, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (lease termination
for cessation of production); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. v. Courson Oil & Gas, Inc., 505
S.W.3d 68 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. filed) (continuous drilling and retained acreage
clause).
58. 483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2016).
59. Id. at 871.
60. Id. at 871–72.
61. Id. at 872.
62. Id.
63. Heritage Res., Inc. v. Nations Bank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 130–31 (Tex. 1996).
64. Hyder, 483 S.W.3d at 872.
300 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 3
the royalty provision expressly adds that the gas royalty is “free and
clear of all production and post-production costs and expenses,” and
then goes further by listing them. This addition has no effect on the
meaning of the provision. It might be regarded as emphasizing the
cost-free nature of the gas royalty, or as surplusage.65
“The court of appeals reasoned otherwise, relying on the ‘free and
clear’ language to conclude that both the oil and gas royalties are free of
postproduction costs. [Lessee] has not challenged that ruling in this
Court.”66 The supreme court evidently wanted to clarify that, under both
market value at the well and proceeds lease royalty provisions, the roy-
alty provisions themselves “excuse the lessors from [directly] bearing
postproduction costs.”67 However, the calculation or determination of the
royalty payable might have the same indirect effect as deducting post-
production costs proportionately.
Turning to the overriding royalty clause, the supreme court first noted
the general rule that “an overriding royalty . . . is free of production costs,
but must bear its share of postproduction costs unless the parties agree
otherwise.”68 Lessor argued that the express requirement in this lease
“that the overriding royalty be ‘cost-free’ can only refer to postproduc-
tion costs, since the royalty is by nature already free of production costs
without saying so.”69 Lessee argued that “‘cost-free overriding royalty’ is
merely a synonym for overriding royalty, and a number of lease provi-
sions [analyzed] in other cases support that view.”70 The supreme court
noted that “[t]he [express] exception for production taxes, which [are]
postproduction expenses, cuts against [Lessee’s] argument . . . [because i]t
would make no sense to state that the royalty is free of production costs,
except for postproduction taxes.”71 Furthermore, “[t]he exception for
taxes might be taken to indicate that ‘cost-free’ refers only to postproduc-
tion costs.”72 However, an illogical taxes “exception” to freedom from
production costs is common in Texas leases.73 Nevertheless, Lessee here
must show that “cost-free” cannot refer to post-production costs in this
lease.74
Lessee argued that “because the overriding royalty is paid on ‘gross
production[,’] the reference is to production at the wellhead, making the
royalty tantamount to one based on the market value of production at the
wellhead, which bears postproduction costs.”75 The supreme court rea-
65. Id. at 873 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. 873 n.18 (citation omitted) (citing Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. Hyder, 427
S.W.3d 472, 477–78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014), aff’d, 483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2016)).
67. Id. at 873.
68. Id. at 871.
69. Id. at 873.
70. Id. at 874.
71. Id.
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soned that “gross production” established the volume on which the over-
riding royalty was due, but “says nothing about whether the overriding
royalty must bear postproduction costs.”76 This “simple ‘cost-free’ re-
quirement of the overriding royalty” clause referenced all costs, including
post-production costs.77
The supreme court also noted that, had Lessor taken Lessor’s “overrid-
ing royalty in kind, as [Lessor was] entitled to do, [Lessor] might have
use[d] the gas on the property, transport[ed] it . . . to a buyer, or pa[id] a
third party to transport the gas to market as [Lessor] might negotiate.”78
The supreme court reasoned that “[t]he fact that the [Lessor] might or
might not be subject to postproduction costs by taking the gas in kind
does not suggest that they must be subject to those costs when the royalty
is paid in cash.”79
The supreme court concluded that “cost-free” as used in this lease and
as applied to the overriding royalty included post-production costs.80 The
supreme court did not rely upon the Heritage Resources disclaimer in the
lease, and the supreme court’s explanation of that holding may be the
most significant part of the case:
Heritage Resources does not suggest, much less hold, that a royalty
cannot be made free of postproduction costs. Heritage Resources
holds only that the effect of a lease is governed by a fair reading of
its text. A disclaimer of that holding, like the one in this case, cannot
free a royalty of postproduction costs when the text of the lease itself
does not do so. Here, the lease text clearly frees the gas royalty of
postproduction costs, and reasonably interpreted, we conclude, does
the same for the overriding royalty. The disclaimer of Heritage Re-
sources’ holding does not influence our conclusion.81
B. APACHE DEEPWATER, LLC V. MCDANIEL PARTNERS, LTD.
In Apache Deepwater, LLC v. McDaniel Partners, Ltd.,82 the Texas Su-
preme Court held that a production payment from land covered by multi-
ple leases was reduced by the expiration of two of the leases.83 The
parties aligned as successors in interest to Grantor and Grantee under a
1953 assignment of four oil and gas leases which reserved a production
payment as follows:
[Grantor] reserves . . . as a “production payment interest,” the title
to and ownership of one-sixteenth of thirty-five sixty-fourths of
seven-eighths (1/16th of 35/64ths of 7/8ths, being one sixteenth of the
entire interest in the production from said lands to which [Grantor]
76. Id.




81. Id. at 876.
82. 485 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. 2016).
83. Id. at 901.
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claims to be entitled under the terms of said respective oil and gas
leases) of the total oil, gas, casinghead gas and other minerals in and
under and which may be produced from the above described land . . .
until the net proceeds of said reserved interest . . . shall have
amounted in the aggregate to [$3,550,000.00 and 1,420,000 barrels of
oil].84
The issue in the case was the meaning and effect of the emphasized lan-
guage in the above provision. Two of the leases expired. The two expired
leases covered thirty-two sixty-fourths of the mineral estate, and the two
leases continuing in effect covered three sixty-fourths of the mineral es-
tate. Grantor contended it was still entitled to one-sixteenth of thirty-five
sixty-fourths of seven-eighths. Grantee contended that Grantor’s interest
was reduced because Grantor owned only one-sixteenth of three sixty-
fourths of seven-eighths.85
The case ultimately turned on the nature and operation of a production
payment and the construction of this particular assignment. There was no
useful precedent on production payments, and the supreme court gener-
ally reasoned from cases involving overriding royalties. “For purposes of
this case, [the supreme court] agree[d] that no meaningful difference ex-
ists between the two.”86 “Normally, when an oil and gas lease terminates,
the overriding royalty created in an assignment of the lease is likewise
extinguished.”87 “And, like an overriding royalty, ‘anything that termi-
nates the lease necessarily destroys the [production] payment.’”88 The su-
preme court held that “the general rule [is] that ‘when an oil and gas
lease terminates, [a] . . . production payment[ ] created in an assignment
of [that] lease is likewise extinguished.’”89
Having resolved the general rule for a production payment, the su-
preme court then turned to an analysis of the assignment to determine
whether the assignment showed that the parties had a different intent.
“This production payment has two parts: (1) the fractional share of pro-
duction that [Grantee] must pay, and (2) the total amount of money and
production that is to be received before the interest terminates.”90 Part
(2) was not contested; the issue was part (1).91
The supreme court looked at what was actually being conveyed in the
assignment, which was four leasehold estates that were fee simple deter-
minable in nature.92 The language in the assignment did not suggest that
the production payment should come out of anything other than each of
84. Id. at 902 n.1 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 903.
86. Id. at 905.
87. Id. (quoting Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1967)).
88. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting A.W. Walker, Jr., Oil Payments, 20 TEX. L.
REV. 259, 288 (1942)).
89. Id. at 908 (quoting Sunac Petroleum Corp., 416 S.W.2d at 804).
90. Id. at 906.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 907.
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the leases.93 All four leases were specifically identified in the assignment,
and the explanatory phrase in the production payment clause referred to
“said respective oil and gas leases,” indicating the leases were to be
treated separately.94 “Absent express language in the assignment to the
contrary, we apply the general rule that ‘when an oil and gas lease termi-
nates, the overriding royalty [or similar production payment] created in
an assignment of the lease is likewise extinguished.’”95 Accordingly, the
correct production payment amount was one-sixteenth of three sixty-
fourths of seven-eighths because the production payment on the termi-
nated leases, which covered thirty-two sixty-fourths, was extinguished.96
This case is significant because it holds that production payments bur-
dening the leasehold estate ordinarily terminate when the lease termi-
nates. The case also has implications for the assignment of production
payments generally, because it is quite common for those assignments to
cover large tracts with many leases, and the parties usually do not address
the possible lease termination question.
C. ADAMS V. MURPHY EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION CO.–USA
In Adams v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co.–USA,97 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the commonly understood meaning
of “offset well” as used in an oil and gas lease offset well clause is “a well
used to protect against drainage.”98 To be entitled to summary judgment,
a party claiming that a well is an “offset well” as a matter of law must
conclusively prove that the well is protecting the leased tract against
drainage from the well on the adjacent tract.99 The lease contained an
offset well clause that would be triggered if a well was “completed as a
producer of oil and/or gas on land adjacent and contiguous to the leased
premises, and within 467 feet of the premises covered by [the] lease.”100
The offset well clause required that Lessee would have the option to ei-
ther drill an offset well, pay Lessor royalties equivalent to the amount of
production as that of the adjacent well, or release the amount of acreage
required for an offset well.101 A triggering horizontal well was drilled and
completed in the Eagle Ford Shale on a tract adjacent to the leased tract.
To satisfy the offset well requirement, Lessee drilled its own horizontal
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 908 (quoting and supplementing Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416
S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1967)).
96. Id.
97. 497 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. filed).
98. Id. at 515 (citing Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 14
(Tex. 2008); Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 410 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex. 1967) (per curiam); Mid-
dle States Petroleum Corp. v. Messenger, 368 S.W.2d 645, 654 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas
1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
99. Id. at 517 (citing Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 14; Nixon v. Mr. Prop.
Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985)).
100. Id. at 512.
101. Id. at 514 (citing Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Ltd. P’ship, 457 S.W.3d 52, 66 (Tex.
2015)).
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Eagle Ford Shale well approximately 2,100 feet from, and parallel to, the
adjacent triggering well (Lessee’s Well).102
Lessor sued for breach of contract, Lessee counterclaimed for a declar-
atory judgment, and Lessee’s summary judgment was the subject of the
appeal.103 The issue was whether Lessee’s well, drilled in response to the
triggering well, was an “offset well” under the lease.104 There was no ad-
ditional definition of “offset well” in the Lease.105 Lessor argued that an
offset well is “a well that actually prevents drainage” and “must be drilled
‘as close as reasonably possible to the [triggering well] so that it can truly
‘offset’ or ‘counterbalance’ the [triggering] well.’”106 Therefore, Lessee
breached the lease because Lessee’s well was not an offset well. Lessee
argued that “the offset well clause does not require an offset well be
drilled [within any] particular . . . distance”; that an offset well is com-
monly understood in the oil and gas industry to mean “any well drilled on
an adjacent lease or property”; and that the distance is particularly irrele-
vant here because both wells were drilled into the Eagle Ford Shale for-
mation, where “drainage across lease lines has limited application.”107
Accordingly, Lessee’s well was an offset well as a matter of law.
The court of appeals started its analysis by stating that it “must give
meaning and effect to all the lease’s words”108 and “[i]f the term offset
well has a commonly understood meaning in the oil and gas industry,” the
commonly understood meaning should be applied.109 In determining the
commonly understood meaning, the court reviewed the definition in a
treatise and examined how Texas courts have defined an offset well.110
The court concluded that “the commonly understood meaning of offset
well is a well used to protect against drainage.”111 In order to conclusively
prove that a well is an offset well, Lessee must show that the well is actu-
ally “protecting [the leased] tract[ ] from drainage by the [triggering]
well.”112
The court of appeals held that the summary judgment evidence offered
by Lessee did not conclusively answer whether Lessee’s well was actually
102. Id. at 512.
103. Id. at 511, 512 n.3.
104. Id. at 514.
105. Id. at 512.
106. Id. at 514.
107. Id. at 514, 516.
108. Id. at 514 (citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex.
2005); Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996)).
109. Id. (citing Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hunt Petroleum (AEC), Inc., 157 S.W.3d 462,
465 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Mescalero Energy, Inc. v. Underwrit-
ers Indem. Gen. Agency, Inc., 56 S.W.3d 313, 320 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001,
pet. denied)).
110. Id. at 514–15.
111. Id. at 515 (citing Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 14
(Tex. 2008); Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 410 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex. 1967) (per curiam); Mid-
dle States Petroleum Corp. v. Messenger, 368 S.W.2d 645, 654 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas
1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
112. Id. at 517 (citing Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 14; Nixon v. Mr. Prop.
Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985)).
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protecting the Lease from drainage from the triggering well.113 Expert
testimony offered by Lessee about the Eagle Ford Shale and typical
drainage patterns was “merely speculative or conclusory” and did not
conclusively prove that the Lessee’s well was an offset well.114 Conse-
quently, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court.115
The significance of this case lies in its holding that an offset well drilled
and completed in the same formation and parallel to the triggering well
may not be an “offset well.” The burden of proof on drainage under the
implied covenant to prevent drainage is generally on the lessor. In this
case, under this express offset-well clause, it appears the burden of proof
shifted to the lessee to prove that the obligation well was actually
preventing drainage.
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS116
A. CATLIN SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO. V. L.A. CONTRACTORS, LTD.
In Catlin Specialty Insurance, Co. v. L.A. Contractors, Ltd.,117 the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that an indemnity
agreement within a Master Service Agreement (MSA) between a truck-
ing contractor and a surface contractor, both providing services to an oil
and gas well site, was not void under the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity
Act (TOAIA) because there was not a “close nexus” to production activi-
ties.118 Shell Oil Company was developing an oil and gas lease, and it
contracted with Wolverine Construction, Inc. (Surface Contractor) to
build well pad sites and private roads. Surface Contractor signed an MSA
that included mutual indemnity provisions with L.A. Contractors, LTD
(Trucking Contractor) for Trucking Contractor to supply and transport
113. Id. at 517.
114. Id. (citing Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. 1999)).
115. Id. at 516–17.
116. Other cases dealing with industry contracts include the following: Fort Apache
Energy, Inc. v. Resaca Res., LLC, No. 09-14-00325-CV, 2016 WL 637985, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Feb. 18, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (durable power of attorney, estoppel
by deed, Division Order statute); SEC v. Arcturus Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 512 (N.D. Tex.
2016) (joint venture agreement as a security); Aery v. Hoskins, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 684 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. filed) (pooling by cross-conveyance as appurtenant to the
land or interest in gross); Garcia v. Genesis Crude Oil, L.P., No. 13-14-00727-CV, 2016 WL
1732436, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 28, 2016, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (payment
satisfies Division Order Statute); In re WBH Energy, LP, No. 15-10003-HCM, 2016 WL
3049666, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. May 20, 2016) (recovery of attorney’s fees under joint
operating agreement); Hardwick v. Smith Energy Co., 500 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2016, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (Statute of Frauds and prospect
agreement); Gemini Ins. Co. v. Drilling Risk Mgmt., Inc., 513 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2016, pet. filed) (blowout insurance); Stetson Petroleum Corp. v. Cathedral
Energy Servs., Inc., No. H-14-1049, 2016 WL 4572197, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2016)
(drilling contract); HighMount Expl. & Prod. LLC v. Harrison Interests, Ltd., 503 S.W.3d
557 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no. pet.) (deduction of fuel gas and marketing
costs from royalty); Shell W. E & P, Inc. v. Pel-State Bulk Plant, LLC, 509 S.W.3d 581
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no. pet.) (construing the Texas mineral lien statute).
117. No. H-14-261, 2016 WL 4276131, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2016), report and recom-
mendation adopted, No. H-14-0261, 2016 WL 4747689 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2016).
118. Id. at *6.
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construction materials and aggregate to Surface Contractor.119 One of
Trucking Contractor’s employees involved in transporting and delivering
a cattle guard was killed in an automobile accident, and the estate
brought a claim against the Surface Contractor.120 The Surface Contrac-
tor made demand upon the Trucking Contractor under the indemnity
clause in the MSA, but the Trucking Contractor refused to defend and
indemnify. The Surface Contractor settled the case, and the Surface Con-
tractor’s excess liability insurance carrier then brought this subrogation
action to recover from the Trucking Contractor under the indemnity
clause in the MSA.121 The issue in the case was whether the indemnity
provision was void because it violates the TOAIA.122
The TOAIA was created to prevent inequity in certain contractor in-
demnity agreements; it states that
an agreement “contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement
pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water . . . is void if it purports to
indemnify a person against loss or liability” when that damage is
based in whole or in part on the indemnitee’s own negligence and
arises from personal injury, death, or property injury.123
The Trucking Contractor argued that the TOAIA applied because the
“TOAIA applies to an agreement concerning the rendering of well or
mine services or performing ‘an act collateral’ to well or mine ser-
vices.”124 The Surface Contractor argued that the incident was related to
the delivery of cattle guards and not the production of oil, so the TOAIA
did not apply and thus the indemnity agreement was enforceable.125
The district court held that the TOAIA would only apply if the service
provided bears a “close nexus with production activities.”126 This is nar-
rowly construed to mean that “the services called for by the contract bear
a close nexus to a well and are directed toward the goal of obtaining or
maintaining production from a well.”127 Further, it is the agreement itself
that governs whether the TOAIA applies, not the specific incident.128 Al-
though “the MSA [did] not specifically outline the work [the Trucking
Company] was to perform on [the Surface Contractor’s] behalf,” the dis-
trict court relied upon the testimony of the Trucking Company for those
facts.129
The district court discussed Coastal Transport Co. v. Crown Central Pe-
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id. at *2, *7.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id. at *6 (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 127.003 (West 2011)).
124. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.001 (West 2011)).
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing John E. Graham & Sons v. Enron Oil & Gas Co. (In re Complaint of
John E. Graham & Sons), 210 F.3d 333, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2000)).
127. Id. (quoting In re Complaint of John E. Graham & Sons, 210 F.3d at 343).
128. Id. at *7 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.003 (West 2011)).
129. Id.
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troleum Corp.,130 where the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether the TOAIA applied between a petroleum company and
a transportation company.131 In that case, the court of appeals found that,
“the [TOAIA] applied to contracts for services involved in the drilling or
servicing of wells, and found that [the petroleum company] was involved
in refining, supplying, and transportation of petroleum, and was therefore
not involved in the drilling or servicing of wells, so the TOAIA did not
apply.”132 Similarly here, the Surface Contractor is a construction com-
pany that is not involved in the drilling and servicing of wells, so a “close
nexus” with production activities did not exist, and therefore the TOAIA
does not apply to the MSA between the Surface Contractor and the
Trucking Contractor.133
The significance of this case lies in its holding that an indemnity agree-
ment in an MSA is not subject to the TOAIA unless there is a “close
nexus” to the actual drilling or servicing of wells.
B. TREGELLAS V. ARCHER TRUST NO. THREE
In Tregellas v. Archer Trust No. Three,134 the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals analyzed the effect of the statute of limitations, discovery rule, con-
structive notice, and a correction deed in the context of an alleged breach
of a right of first refusal to purchase minerals. On June 16, 2003, the Cook
family (Grantor), which then owned both the surface and mineral estate
in a tract in Hansford County, Texas (Land), conveyed only the surface to
the trustees of various trusts (Grantee). In a separate but contemporane-
ous document, Grantor granted to Grantee a right of first refusal
(ROFR) to purchase the minerals on the Land.135 The ROFR stated that
“in the event that [Grantor], and/or their successors and/or assigns, desire
to sell any or all of the [Land], [Grantee], their heirs and assigns, shall
have the right to purchase the [Land on the same terms offered],” but
“[t]his Right of First Refusal shall be subordinate to and [Grantor] or
their successors or assigns . . . shall have the right to execute, to mortgage
or otherwise encumber the [Land].136 The parties aligned as successors-
in-interest to Grantor and Grantee under the ROFR.137
There were two separate sales. On March 28, 2007, Sharon and Rodney
Farber (two of the family members included in Grantor) sold their undi-
vided mineral interest in the Land by a mineral deed that was subse-
quently recorded on March 30, 2007 (Farber Sale). It was undisputed that
130. 20 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
131. Catlin Specialty Ins. Co., 2016 WL 4276131 at *7 (citing Coastal Transp. Co., 20
S.W.3d at 127).
132. Id. (citing Coastal Transp. Co., 20 S.W.3d at 127).
133. Id. (citing John E. Graham & Sons v. Enron Oil & Gas Co. (In re Complaint of
John E. Graham & Sons), 210 F.3d 333, 343 (5th Cir. 2000)).
134. 507 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. filed).
135. Id. at 426.
136. Id. at 427.
137. Id. at 426.
308 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 3
Grantee was not notified about Grantor’s intention to make the Farber
Sale, and Grantee was not given an opportunity to purchase the mineral
interest under the terms of the ROFR. On May 4, 2011, Grantee acquired
actual knowledge about the Farber Sale and filed suit against Grantor the
next day.138
Grantor argued that the trial court erred in ordering specific perform-
ance of the ROFR regarding the Farber Sale because Grantee filed the
suit outside the statute of limitations.139 The court of appeals agreed, rea-
soning that a suit for specific performance of an agreement for an ROFR
is the same as a suit for specific performance of a contract.140 The statute
of limitations for specific performance of a contract is four years after the
cause of action accrues.141 Determining when the cause of action accrues
is a question of law.142 “Under the discovery rule, accrual of a cause of
action is deferred until the injured party learned of, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of, the injury-causing act.”143
The Texas Supreme Court has held that this rule should be applied to
breach of contract suits only in rare cases because diligent parties “should
generally discover any breach during the relatively long four-year limita-
tions period provided for such claims.”144
As is true in this case, because of the requirements of the statute of
frauds and the recording statutes, a conveyance of real property in
violation of a right of first refusal is very likely to be reflected in a
publicly-recorded instrument. Once properly recorded, the instru-
ment is subject to inspection by the public. And knowledge of the
conveyance is likely to be readily available from other public sources
like tax rolls and from commercial sources like abstractors.145
That is, the injury was not “inherently undiscoverable,” and therefore the
discovery rule was not applicable.146
The deed on the Farber Sale was executed on March 28 and recorded
on March 30, 2007.147 The court of appeals recites that the limitations
period commenced when the injury was sustained on March 28, unless
the accrual date was tolled.148 The same result would evidently follow if
the deed was never recorded; therefore, the court held that limitations on
138. Id. at 427.
139. Id. at 429–30.
140. Id. at 430.
141. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(1) (West 2002); Gil-
breath v. Steed, No. 12-11-00251-CV, 2013 WL 2146230, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 15,
2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
142. Id. at 432 (citing Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 226 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)).
143. Id. (citing Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. 2015)).
144. Id. (quoting Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam)).
145. Id. at 433 (internal footnote and citations omitted) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 13.001 (West 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (West 2015)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 427.
148. Id. at 432.
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breach of an ROFR runs from the date of the deed because there is usu-
ally a deed and it is usually recorded.149
Grantee, on a motion for rehearing, argued that the court “failed to
give effect to Texas case law that owners of property are under no duty
routinely to search the deed records for later-filed documents impugning
their title.”150 The court held that Grantee owned no interest in the min-
erals and the ROFR was merely a contractual right.151 Grantee also cited
authority “for the proposition that Texas law provides that the holder of a
right of first refusal has no duty to act until the holder receives notice of a
sale in violation of the right.”152 Nevertheless, the court held that
whether or not the discovery rule applied was decided on a categorical
basis and that the breach was not inherently undiscoverable.153
Because there is usually a deed and deeds are usually recorded, the
court of appeals reasoned that “the [Grantee’s] injury [was] of the type
that generally is discoverable by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”154
The application of the discovery rule is decided on a “categorical” basis,
which means that, under this decision, the cause of action for breach of
ROFRs on real property will run from an accrual date no later than the
date the conveyance in breach is executed. To protect the holder’s inter-
est, the holder is effectively required to continually check the deed
records, which, of course, no one intends to do when an ROFR is created.
This was a bench trial in which the trial court found all the elements nec-
essary under the discovery rule and expressly held that Grantee had no
duty to consult the public record.155 The court expressly did not base its
decision on constructive notice, but rather only on the general limitation
of the discovery rule that the rule may only be invoked when the injury is
inherently undiscoverable.156 It should be noted that this was a contrac-
tual ROFR, not recorded, and not an interest running with the land.
In 2008, Brenda Cook Smith (one of the members of Grantor) died,
leaving her undivided mineral interest to her husband, Ed Smith, and son,
Dalton Smith. The Smiths negotiated a sale of her mineral interest (Smith
Sale) for $20,000, which was never completed.157 Once again, Grantee
was neither notified of the intended sale nor given an option to purchase
the mineral interest involved in this second sale.158
After Grantee filed suit on the Farber Sale, the Smith Sale was revived
and restructured as a loan using a deed of trust. There was a ninety-day
promissory note in the amount of $20,000, secured by a deed of trust on
149. Id. at 432–33.
150. Id. at 433.
151. Id. at 433–34.
152. Id. at 434 (citing Koch Indus., Inc. v. Sun Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1203, 1212 (5th Cir.
1990)).
153. Id.
154. See id. at 433.
155. Id. at 433–34.
156. Id. at 433 n.10.
157. Id. at 427.
158. Id. at 428.
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the mineral interest, a default, and a non-judicial foreclosure sale in Au-
gust 2012. Grantee first learned of the Smith Sale in November 2012 and
amended the earlier petition against the Farber Sale to include the Smith
Sale.159
Grantor argued that there was no breach of the ROFR regarding the
Smith Sale because Grantor transferred the mineral interest through a
non-judicial foreclosure sale.160 The Texas Supreme Court has held that
“the holder of a right of first refusal was not entitled to exercise the right
at the time of a foreclosure sale of the land under a deed of trust,”161 but
there may be an exception if the deed of trust was “a subterfuge or de-
vice” used to sell the land.162 The court declined to consider whether that
exception existed or applied in this case.163
The court held that Grantor breached the ROFR because Grantor did
not disclose that Grantor was willing to sell the mineral interest.164 An
ROFR carries with it “the right to receive notice of a third-party of-
fer.”165 Therefore, because Grantor did not give notice of Grantor’s will-
ingness to sell, which was undisputed, Grantor breached the ROFR with
the proposed 2008 Smith Sale before the mineral interest was actually
sold in 2011 by way of a foreclosure.166 The court affirmed the trial
court’s granting of specific performance as to the Smith Sale but reversed
as to the Farber Sale.167
After closing on the ROFR in 2003, Grantee discovered that the prop-
erty description in the ROFR listed the incorrect county. Grantee’s attor-
ney corrected the mistake and sent the new document to Grantor. Two
family members signed the corrected document in February 2004, and it
was recorded in September of that year. None of the other family mem-
bers responded or signed it.168
Grantor argued that the ROFR violated the statute of frauds because it
listed the wrong county and that the correction instrument was ineffective
to cure the ROFR because it did not comply with Section 5.031 of the
Texas Property Code.169
Section 5.031 makes a correction instrument recorded before Sep-
tember 1, 2011, that substantially complies with Property Code sec-
tion 5.028 or 5.029 and that purports to correct a recorded original
instrument of conveyance effective to the same extent as provided in
section 5.030 unless a court “renders a final judgment determining
159. Id. at 427–28.
160. Id. at 434.
161. Id. (citing Draper v. Gochman, 400 S.W.2d 545, 545 (Tex. 1966)).
162. Id. at 435 (quoting Draper, 400 S.W.2d at 547).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 436–37.
165. Id. at 435 (citing JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11.4 (Matthew
Bender, 2016)).
166. Id. at 436–37.
167. Id. at 437.
168. Id. at 427–28.
169. Id. at 428 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.031 (West 2014)).
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that the correction instrument does not substantially comply” with
section 5.028 or 5.029.170
In this case, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that the 2004 correction instrument did substan-
tially comply with Sections 5.028 and 5.029.171 Specifically, the correction
was “nonmaterial” as defined by Section 5.028.172 It was undisputed that
the error in the county name was typographical, and substantial compli-
ance with the statute excuses these types of errors.173 Therefore, the court
held that Grantee met the essential requirements of Section 5.028 in pre-
paring and recording the 2004 correction instrument, and the court did
not reach the statute of frauds question.174
The significance of this case lies in the court’s holding that a cause of
action for breach of a contractual ROFR on real property accrues no
later than the date a conveyance in breach of the ROFR is executed, and
the discovery rule does not apply.
C. NORTH SHORE ENERGY, L.L.C. V. HARKINS
In North Shore Energy, L.L.C. v. Harkins,175 the Texas Supreme Court
held that an option to lease did not preclude others from entering the
optioned lands and conducting geophysical operations.176 In 1995, Lease
#1 was granted by Owners to Lessee #1, covering approximately 400
acres. In 1996 (while Lease #1 was still in effect), Lease #2 was granted by
Owners to Lessee #2, covering approximately 1300 acres out of 1700 acres
save and except the 400 acres covered by Lease #1. Lease #1 terminated.
In 2009, Owners entered into an Option Agreement with Lessee #3 that
allowed Lessee #3 to select multiple small tracts to be separately leased at
Lessee #3’s option out of the same lands described in Lease #2, which had
terminated. A few months later, Lessee #3 gave Owners notice under the
Option Agreement that it was exercising its option, and Lessee #3 paid
the lease option exercise price of $200 per acre for a 169.9-acre tract.
Lessee #3 did not actually execute a formal lease with Owners because a
lease form was attached to the Option Agreement. Lessee #3 drilled a
producing well on its optioned 169.9-acre tract. A large portion of that
acreage was included in the 400 acres originally leased under Lease #1,
and the well itself was located on that same 400 acres. Lease #4 was
granted by Owners to Lessee #4, covering the same 400 acres originally
covered by Lease #1.177 Lessee #4, with Owners’ permission, conducted a
seismic survey over all of the land subject to the Option Agreement dur-
170. Id. (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.031 (West 2014)).
171. Id. at 429.
172. Id at 428 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.028(a)(1) (West 2014)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 429.
175. 501 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).
176. Id. at 600.
177. Id. at 600–01.
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ing the option period.178 Lessee #3 sued Lessee #4 and Owners, who then
counterclaimed on competing claims of title, trespass, conversion, tor-
tious interference, and for damages, with an additional geophysical tres-
pass claim by Lessee #3 against Lessee #4.179
On appeal, most of the opinion focused on whether the 400 acres was
subject to the Option Agreement.180 After parsing the language of the
Option Agreement, the supreme court ultimately decided that the Option
Agreement was subject to only one reasonable interpretation and was
therefore not ambiguous; thus, the Option Agreement excluded the 400-
acre Lease #1 tract from the optioned acreage as a matter of law.181 The
supreme court primarily relied upon a four-corners analysis of the Option
Agreement itself, but also considered the circumstances surrounding its
execution to determine whether an ambiguity existed.182 Specifically, the
supreme court considered the $50-per-acre option bonus payable upon
execution of the Option Agreement and the fact that, mathematically, the
total sum paid excluded the 400 acres.183
Because the 400-acre tract was not included in the optioned land, the
trial court victory for Lessee #3 collapsed. Owners could not be liable for
breach of contract or for attorney’s fees, nor could Lessee #3 be liable for
taking a lease on the 400-acre tract.184 This left only Lessee #3’s claim
against Lessee #4 for geophysical trespass.185
Under the Option Agreement, Owners granted to Lessee #3 the “ex-
clusive option to acquire oil and gas leases on all or a portion of Said
Land under the terms and provisions of that certain Oil and Gas Lease
form set forth on Exhibit ‘B.’”186 The lease form granted exclusive explo-
ration rights, but Lessee #3 never executed the lease.187 The supreme
court focused only on the Option Agreement, which did not explicitly
grant to Lessee #3 the exclusive right to explore for minerals or to ex-
clude others from doing so before it exercised its option.188 “An option
agreement does not pass title or convey an interest in property.”189 Be-
cause Lessee #3 never exercised its option, it had no right of possession or
title and thus no standing to assert geophysical trespass.190
This is a contract interpretation case. The significance of this case lies
in the supreme court’s use of the option bonus payment as “surrounding
178. Id. at 605.
179. Id. at 601.
180. Id. at 602–04.
181. Id. at 604 (citing Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940
S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996)).
182. Id. at 602 (citing Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors Inc., 473
S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. 2015)).
183. Id. at 603.




188. Id. at 606.
189. Id. at 605.
190. Id. at 606.
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circumstances” to conclude that the Option Agreement was not ambigu-
ous, as well as its holding that an Option Agreement, with an attached
exclusive-right-to-explore lease form, is not an agreement that will bar
others from exploring during the option term.
V. LITIGATION ISSUES191
A. SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY PRODUCTION CO. V. BERRY-HELFAND
In Southwestern Energy Production Co. v. Berry-Helfand,192 the Texas
Supreme Court examined the proper remedy, damages, and proof of
damages when a trade secret oil and gas prospect is misappropriated. In
this case, the evidence presented for trade-secret-misappropriation dam-
ages was held legally insufficient to support the entire jury award, and the
case was reversed and remanded for new trial.193
Toby Berry–Helfand (Engineer) worked for seven years analyzing data
across five counties in East Texas to identify very specific “‘sweet spots’
for drilling and producing from the James Lime [reservoir] with multiple
stacked payout.”194 In 2004, Engineer obtained leases covering 6,300
acres in two specific sweet spots called the Pearson and Pearson North-
east prospects in Nacogdoches County to generate interest in the drill-
ready prospects and the broader James Lime play. In February 2005, En-
gineer pitched the deal to Southwestern Energy Production Co.
(SEPCO).195
“Before [Engineer] disclosed any information, . . . SEPCO executed a
confidentiality and noncompete agreement that required SEPCO to
maintain the information’s confidentiality, use it solely to evaluate the
Pearson prospects for purchase from or development with [Engineer],”
and “not to compete with [Engineer] in a specified area of mutual inter-
est for one year.”196 Engineer then “provided detailed information about
the Pearson prospects and identified sweet-spot prospects throughout the
play.”197 “At the time of the presentation, SEPCO had not acquired any
mineral leases with James Lime as the primary drilling objective, had
never drilled a James Lime well, had been dissuaded from pursuing James
Lime ventures by an internal study conducted in 2003, had declined to
participate in a James Lime play with [a third party] in 2003, and had zero
191. Other cases dealing with litigation issues include the following: Arbuckle
Mountain Ranch of Tex., Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 810 F.3d 335 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2522 (2016) (class action on leases terminated by foreclosure); Longoria
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 04-15-00536-CV, 2016 WL 4013793, at *1 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio July 27, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (necessary parties); Carlton Energy Group,
LLC v. Phillips, No. 01-09-00997-CV, 2016 WL 4536284, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 30, 2016, no. pet.) (prospect valuation).
192. 491 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. 2016).
193. Id. at 704–05.
194. Id. at 705, 705 n.2.
195. Id. at 706.
196. Id. at 707.
197. Id.
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horizontal wells.”198
SEPCO never extended an offer to Engineer. Engineer then closed a
deal with Petrohawk Properties, L.P. (Petrohawk) on the Pearson pros-
pects specifically and a broader deal across three counties.199 “By the fall
of 2010, SEPCO had acquired 1,888 leases and drilled more than 140
wells—88 of them James Lime horizontal wells—in areas clustered
around the sweet spots [Engineer] had identified.”200 Almost all of
SEPCO’s leases were in the sweet spots, all of the wells produced, and
those wells “generated an undisputed $381.5 million in production reve-
nue.”201 The jury found that SEPCO “misused proprietary information
acquired under [the] confidentiality agreement.”202 Additionally, liability
was not contested on this appeal.203
The principal evidence on damages was the contemporaneous Pe-
trohawk agreement, Engineer’s testimony, and expert testimony by Engi-
neer’s expert. Rather than call an expert witness, SEPCO instead
attacked Engineer’s evidence and the expert’s methodology.204 Under
the Petrohawk agreement, Engineer received $1.8 million for the Pearson
prospects, an overriding royalty interest, a 6.25% back-in after payout,
monthly consulting fees, and a similar arrangement across three counties.
“Hundreds and hundreds” of leases were acquired by Petrohawk.205 The
overriding royalty was generally about 3%, but it was a sliding-scale roy-
alty, subject to expansion or reduction based on existing lease burdens,
with more than one trigger point. The overriding royalty could have
ranged from zero to about 6.75%.
Engineer testified that she received an average of 3% on her Pe-
trohawk leases, and although she did not testify that such terms were
“reasonable and customary” or provide an average for all of the leases,
the supreme court accepted that testimony as “some evidence of ‘the
prices past purchasers or licensees of the trade secret may have paid.’”206
There was also some evidence that some of the SEPCO wells had a net
revenue interest greater than 75%, which would support at least some
overriding royalty under the Petrohawk agreement’s scheme of a sliding-
scale royalty.207 The expert also testified that the Petrohawk deal would
be “a customary and reasonable type of compensation that someone
would receive for identifying a prospect.”208 The expert opined as to a
damages number considerably larger than the number the jury awarded.
The critical issue in the case was the 3% “average” overriding royalty that
198. Id. at 706.
199. Id. at 707–08.
200. Id. at 709.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 704.
203. Id. at 710.
204. Id. at 716.
205. Id. at 708.
206. Id. at 714.
207. Id. at 714–15.
208. Id. at 715–16.
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the expert assumed in his calculations based on Engineer’s testimony
about her experience with the Petrohawk leases.209
The jury similarly found SEPCO’s “profits” to be $381.5 million (which
corresponds to the evidence of past production revenue). A 3% overrid-
ing royalty applied to that number equals $11.445 million, which was the
number the jury awarded for past damages. The jury awarded $0 for fu-
ture damages and $0 for exemplary damages.210 The trial court ordered a
post-verdict accounting and awarded an additional $23.89 million in equi-
table disgorgement of profits and $4.6 million in attorney’s fees and
interest.211
There are multiple ways to prove damages for misappropriation of a
trade secret, including the value of the plaintiff’s lost profits, the defen-
dant’s actual profits, the value another would have paid, the development
costs saved by the defendant, and a reasonable royalty.212 For claims aris-
ing after September 1, 2013, there is an applicable statute.213 The parties
disputed the reliability of the Expert’s damages calculation.
The supreme court noted that “the Petrohawk agreement actually em-
ploys a sliding-scale overriding royalty tied to the total royalty burden,
and analogous agreements in the record similarly bear payout terms tied
to the total royalty burden.”214 Consequently, “the sliding scale in the
Petrohawk agreement zeroes out at a specified threshold.”215 The su-
preme court noted that “[f]ailure to take the sliding-scale overriding roy-
alty into consideration in calculating a reasonable royalty for [Engineer’s]
trade secret[ ] [was] a critical misstep. . . . [W]hen there is objective evi-
dence from which more certainty can be gleaned, it is incumbent on the
plaintiff to produce that evidence.”216
The supreme court further noted that “because the actual overriding
royalty interest on the [SEPCO] wells could have been determined,” us-
ing the average overriding royalty received under the Petrohawk agree-
ment was not probative.217 The supreme court remanded because there
was evidence to support damages, but less than the full amount
awarded.218
Because the supreme court remanded for a new trial, it declined to
address or rule upon a number of other issues. Perhaps most importantly,
the Tyler Court of Appeals had held that disgorgement of profits was not
available, to which the supreme court responded: “[W]e have not ex-
pressly limited the [equitable disgorgement of profits] remedy to fiduci-
209. Id. at 715.
210. Id. at 710.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 711 (citing Bohnsack v. Varco, L.P., 668 F.3d 262, 280 (5th Cir. 2012)).
213. Id. at 711 n.7 (citing Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE §§ 134A.001–.008, 134.003, .004) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016)).




218. Id. at 721.
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ary relationships nor foreclosed equitable relief for breach of trust in
other types of confidential relationships.”219
The significance of this case lies in the supreme court’s guidance given
on the measure of damages, the role of expert testimony, and the burden
of proof in recovering for a lost prospect. The case was tried on theories
of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, theft, and fraud.
B. SANER V. BRIDGETEX PIPELINE CO.
In Saner v. BridgeTex Pipeline Co.,220 the Eastland Court of Appeals
held that, in order “to satisfy the constitutional ‘public use’ requirement,
. . . a person intending to build a pipeline” for crude petroleum under
Section 111.002(1) of the Natural Resources Code must demonstrate that
a reasonable probability exists that “the pipeline will at some point after
construction serve the public by transporting crude petroleum for one or
more customers who will either retain ownership of their crude petro-
leum or sell it to parties other than the carrier.”221
BridgeTex Pipeline Company, LLC (BridgeTex) was engaged in the
construction of a pipeline for the transportation of crude petroleum from
the Permian Basin to the Texas Gulf Coast.222 In 2013, the Texas Railroad
Commission (TRC) designated BridgeTex as a common carrier and
granted it a T-4 permit.223 BridgeTex, through condemnation, acquired an
easement for a crude petroleum pipeline that would run across Walter B.
Saner’s (Saner) land.224 Saner challenged the proposed taking by arguing
that the pipeline was not built for a constitutional public use.225
In Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex.
LLC,226 the Texas Supreme Court held that “[t]o qualify as a common
carrier with the power of eminent domain, [a] pipeline must serve the
public; it cannot be built only for the builder’s exclusive use.”227 The su-
preme court established a test for determining what qualifies as a public
use for a carbon dioxide pipeline by holding that “under Section
111.002(6), a reasonable probability must exist that the pipeline will at
some point after construction serve the public by transporting gas for one
or more customers who will either retain ownership of their gas or sell it
to parties other than the carrier.”228 The Denbury court limited its deci-
sion to “‘persons seeking common-carrier pipeline status under Section
219. Id. at 729.
220. No. 11-14-00199-CV, 2016 WL 4009973, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 21, 2016,
pet. denied).
221. Id. at *3 (citing Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline—Tex.,
LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. 2012)).




226. 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012).
227. Saner, 2016 WL 4009973, at *2 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quot-
ing Denbury Green Pipeline—Tex., LLC, 363 S.W.3d at 200).
228. Id. (quoting Denbury Green Pipeline—Tex., LLC, 363 S.W.3d at 202).
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111.002(6)’ applicable to carbon dioxide pipelines.”229
The court of appeals agreed with other Texas courts of appeals in con-
cluding that, “[d]espite Denbury’s limitation to carbon dioxide pipelines,
. . . [the] ‘reasonable probability’ test [applied] to other provisions of the
Natural Resources Code, including the provision granting common car-
rier status to crude petroleum pipelines.”230 Accordingly, the court of ap-
peals held that “to satisfy the constitutional ‘public use’ requirement . . . a
person intending to build a pipeline under Section 111.002(1)” must
demonstrate that “a reasonable probability . . . exist[s] that the pipeline
will . . . serve the public by transporting crude petroleum for one or more
customers who will either retain ownership of their crude petroleum or
sell it to parties other than the carrier.”231
The evidence introduced included testimony that “BridgeTex ha[d] en-
tered into a transportation services agreement with a [third-party ship-
per]”; “BridgeTex was in negotiations with twelve to fourteen other third-
party shippers who may either become contract shippers or spot ship-
pers”; “BridgeTex had received five unsolicited applications from pro-
spective spot shippers”; and “the pipeline [would] be connected to seven
to ten refineries, not owned by BridgeTex, along the Texas Gulf
Coast.”232 The court of appeals held that the evidence introduced at trial
satisfied Denbury’s reasonable probability test; thus, the pipeline was
built for a constitutional public use.233
This case is significant in that the court extends the application of
Denbury’s reasonable probability test to Section 111.002(1) of the Natu-
ral Resources Code, which grants common carrier status to crude petro-
leum pipelines.
VI. REGULATION ISSUES234
A. SOUTHWEST ROYALTIES, INC. V. HEGAR
In Southwest Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar,235 the Texas Supreme Court held
that a sales tax exemption for equipment used in processing was not ap-
229. Id. (quoting Denbury Green Pipeline—Tex., LLC, 363 S.W.3d at 202 n.28).
230. Id. (citing Crawford Family Farm P’ship v. TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P.,
409 S.W.3d 908, 922 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied); Crosstex NGL Pipeline,
L.P. v. Reins Rd. Farms–1, Ltd., 404 S.W.3d 754, 761 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no
pet.)).
231. Id. at *3 (citing Denbury Green Pipeline—Tex., LLC363 S.W.3d at 202).
232. Id.
233. Id. at *4.
234. Other cases dealing with regulation issues include the following: R.R. Comm’n of
Tex. v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 482 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2016) (Texas Railroad Commission
(TRC) negligence in plugging well); Samson Lone Star Ltd. P’ship v. Hooks, 497 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. filed) (TRC records as notice); Texas v. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 829 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2016) (Clean Air Act and coal-fired electrical
generating plants); Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
No. 4:16-1250, 2016 WL 3855865 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2016) (Natural Gas Act), appeal
docketed, No. 16-20642 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2016).
235. 500 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2016).
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plicable to downhole equipment such as casing, tubing, and pumps.236
The sales tax exemption applied to
tangible personal property directly used or consumed in or during
the actual . . . processing . . . of tangible personal property for ulti-
mate sale if the use or consumption of the property is necessary or
essential to the . . . processing . . . operation and directly makes or
causes a chemical or physical change to . . . the product being . . .
processed . . . for ultimate sale.237
Southwest Roylaties, Inc. (Southwest) argued that “hydrocarbons ex-
tracted from an underground reservoir must be separated into their com-
ponent parts to produce saleable products, and the equipment for which
it sought refunds was used in ‘processing’ the hydrocarbons as they were
extracted from the reservoir.”238 The trial court ruled against Southwest
because Southwest’s equipment did not directly cause the change in the
hydrocarbons.239 The Austin Court of Appeals also ruled against South-
west because it found the use of the word “processing” in the statute to
be ambiguous, and the Comptroller’s interpretation was not plainly erro-
neous or inconsistent.240 The issue before the supreme court was whether
Southwest’s equipment was used for “processing” and, if so, whether
Southwest’s processing was the actual and direct cause of the chemical or
physical change in the hydrocarbons.241
The supreme court first interpreted the tax statute. Because “process-
ing” was not defined, the supreme court gave the word its ordinary mean-
ing.242 It essentially adopted the Comptroller’s definition and held that
the term “processing” meant “the application of materials and labor nec-
essary to modify or change characteristics of tangible personal prop-
erty.”243 “[I]t is undisputed that hydrocarbons undergo physical changes
as they move from underground reservoirs to the surface; the disagree-
ment is about the role Southwest’s equipment plays in those changes.”244
Expert testimony for the State established that “phase changes” in the oil
and gas were a “natural, physical process that occurs from the reservoir to
the top of a well and whether casing was in the well was only incidental to
the changes” because “the casing and tubing were essentially only con-
duits through which the hydrocarbons exit the reservoir and proceed to
the surface.”245
Thus, the supreme court narrowed its inquiry to “whether the equip-
ment . . . was used in the actual physical application of materials and labor
236. Id. at 402.
237. Id.; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a)(2) (West 2015).
238. Southwest Royalties, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 403.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 403–04.
241. Id. at 404.
242. Id. at 405 (citing State v. $1,760.00 in U.S. Currency, 406 S.W.3d 177, 180 (Tex.
2013)).
243. Id. at 406.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 407.
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to the hydrocarbons that was necessary to cause, and caused, a physical
change to them.”246 The supreme court reasoned that the changes in the
substances were natural changes, and “[w]hile the equipment unquestion-
ably was both used in and necessary to the efficient recovery of hydrocar-
bons from their reservoirs, there is no evidence that the equipment acted
upon the hydrocarbons to modify or change their characteristics.”247
“Southwest did not prove that the equipment for which it sought a tax
exemption was used in ‘actual manufacturing, processing, or fabricating’
of hydrocarbons within the meaning of Tax Code section 151.318[(a)](2),
(5), or (10),” and was therefore not entitled to a tax exemption.248
Phase changes in hydrocarbons from the reservoir to the surface are
the result of changes in temperature and pressure, and not the result of
casing, tubing, and pumps. The significance of this case lies in the su-
preme court’s holding that the downhole equipment is not exempt from
sales tax because only equipment used in processing the hydrocarbons is
exempt. “Processing” in this context means changing the characteristics
of tangible personal property.249
VII. CONCLUSION
Title examiners in Texas are continually faced with the difficult task of
resolving the meaning of older conveyances including multiple fractions
in which the intent of the parties may be unclear. There are thousands of
instruments with this problem. In Hysaw v. Dawkins,250 the Texas Su-
preme Court restates its bias toward a four-corners rule of construction to
determine the intent of the parties, uninhibited by a set of formal rules of
construction. However, Hysaw is an attempt to reduce the number of
deed construction cases driven by this issue. It broadly assumes that par-
ties do not usually intend a complicated division of interest, and the sur-
rounding circumstances at the time of execution should inform the courts
when resolving these controversies. Perhaps the new rule of construction
is Occam’s Razor.251
Although Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock252 will be cited
as a landmark case at the confluence of water law and oil and gas law for
extending the accommodation doctrine to severed groundwater estates, it
is equally important for the emphasis it gives to the rules presented in the
Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc.253 case, which explain that the mineral
246. Id. (emphasis added).
247. Id. at 407–08.
248. Id. at 409.
249. Id. at 406 (citing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300(a)(10) (2004) (Comptroller of Pub.
Accounts, Manufacturing; Custom Manufacturing; Fabricating; Processing)).
250. 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
251. See generally Casarez v. Val Verde County, 16 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 (W.D. Tex.
1998) (explaining that the phrase “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem,”
otherwise known as Occam’s Razor, means “[d]on’t complicate things any more than is
required”—i.e., “keep it simple.”).
252. 498 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 2016).
253. 407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013).
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estate is, indeed, the dominant estate.
The Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Hyder254 case deals with an
overriding royalty on its face, but the reasoning and holding in that case
applies to royalties generally and to post-production costs in particular.
Simplified, if the intent is to make the royalty cost-free, then the drafts-
man should use the words “cost-free” and not just market value. Lessors
for years have insisted on market-value royalty clauses to insulate them-
selves from the risk and vagaries of a proceeds lease, but it is clear that
market value at the well, without more, will always burden the lessor’s
royalty with its proportionate part of post-production costs.
These cases and the other Texas Supreme Court cases reported are the
ones most likely to have a lasting impact, but there are also groups of
cases clustered around recurring issues that are gradually adding defini-
tion to the scope of those issues.
The discovery rule continues to be narrowly construed and limited on a
categorical basis. The scope of the application of the rule is very impor-
tant in the oil and gas industry because many property rights are based on
real property, and many industry agreements can last for decades. Long
periods of time may elapse before there is actual knowledge of an injury.
Texas has had its share of cases attacking pipelines, with a frequent
issue being challenges to the “public purpose” foundation of a condemna-
tion. Under present Texas law and case law, it appears that this issue will
continue to be a relatively easy hurdle to jump, and Texas will remain
“pipeline friendly.”
As 2016 closes, the industry is waiting to see if pledged production cuts
will materialize, what the effect on the balance between supply and de-
mand will be, and how fast America’s shale producers will ramp up their
operations. It is widely reported that approximately one hundred U.S.
exploration and production companies have failed during this downturn,
and approximately one-half of the rigs operating in the United States are
now operating in the Permian Basin.
The effect on reported Texas cases is not yet apparent, but it seems
likely that the number of reported cases dealing with conveyancing and
leasing issues will tail off, and there will be more cases on industry con-
tracts and operational issues as operators focus on completions and drill-
ing on existing leases.
254. 483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2016).
